Guatemala's electricity regulations incorporated a definition that may be decisive for the contracts of Open Tender 1-2026 : when a firm import from the Regional Electricity Market (MER) is not enough to supply the contracted demand, the Distributor must buy the difference in the Guatemalan Opportunity Market .
The provision arises from Resolution CNEE-282-2026, through which the National Electric Energy Commission modified the Commercial Coordination Standards (NCC) 2, 3, 9, 10 and 13 to specify the procedures applicable to firm imports from the regional market.
The change coincides with Open Tender 1-2026 , planned to contract approximately 300 MW of power and energy related to the remaining unawarded capacity from PEG-5 and to new needs arising from increased demand. The interaction between these two provisions raises a key point: the costs of managing a transaction in the MER and the risk generated by a shortage do not necessarily fall on the same agent .
According to Edgar Rigoberto Grotewold de León, a lawyer and notary specializing in Energy Law, tenders and commercial contracting of power and energy , the resolution must be analyzed together with the conditions provided for in the terms of the call.
“ It is worth reading it together with Annex B of the Open Tender 1-2026 Terms and Conditions ,” said Grotewold de León.
This section regulates participation through International Transactions , a modality by which a generator can submit a supply offer to a Distributor backed by a firm import contract of the MER, instead of doing so through a central facility installed in Guatemala.
Two risks that do not necessarily fall on the same actor
Annex B establishes an initial distribution of responsibilities related to the administration and operation costs of the regional transaction , while Resolution CNEE-282-2026 introduces specific treatment for a possible supply shortage.
Section viii stipulates that the bidder participating through an International Transaction must include in its price all costs to the Wholesale Market and the Regional Electricity Market related to the administration and operation of the contract.
“ The bidder participating through this channel must include in their price all costs associated with the administration and operation of the contract in the Wholesale Market and the Regional Electricity Market ,” explained Grotewold de León.
The obligation includes administrative charges and any expenses inherent to the management and execution of the contract. These costs are the sole responsibility of the successful bidder for the entire duration of the contract , while section ix extends the responsibility to charges arising from the execution and administration of the transaction in accordance with the Regional Electricity Market Regulations.
“ Up to this point, the minutes place the operational risk of the MER on the side of the Awardee ,” the specialist pointed out.
Resolution CNEE-282-2026 addresses another scenario . The modifications introduced in NCC 10 and 13 establish the procedure when the volume received from the MER is not sufficient to supply all the demand contemplated in the contract.
In that scenario, the Consumer Participant, i.e., the Distributor, must go to the Guatemalan Opportunity Market to acquire the difference . In turn, the Generator or Marketer will not be able to complete that shortfall through the same channel.
“ When firm imports are insufficient to cover contracted demand, the new regime of NCC 10 and NCC 13 stipulates that the Consumer Participant, that is, the Distributor, must go to the Guatemalan Opportunity Market to buy the difference, without the Generator or Marketer being able to cover that shortfall through that channel ,” Grotewold de León pointed out.
The practical consequence is a separation between the responsibility associated with the costs of the MER and the mechanism intended to resolve a supply shortage . This difference can affect pricing, contingency assessment, and the negotiation of future contracts.
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“ The cost responsibility set by the minutes and the mechanism for distributing the shortfall, which is now defined by the technical regulations, operate on different risks ,” the lawyer warned.
Under this interpretation, assuming the costs of executing and managing a confirmed import does not automatically mean also absorbing the consequences of the imported volume being insufficient . This point is particularly relevant because the regulations and technical standards govern different aspects of the same operation.
“ Their interaction is not resolved by the text of Annex B alone ,” Grotewold de León argued.
Firm Rights: another variable that can affect the contract
The resolution also incorporated a risk linked to the continuity of Firm Rights acquired in the MER , an aspect that must be considered by those who use imports as backing for their bids.
The new section 2.2.4.1 of NCC 2 provides that, when the term of the Firm Rights expires and its renewal for the remaining contractual period is not proven, the Efficient Firm Offer corresponding to that import is reduced to zero.
“ It reduces to zero the Efficient Firm Offer associated with the import when, upon expiration of the term of the Firm Rights acquired in the MER, its renewal for the remainder of the contractual term is not accredited ,” explained Grotewold de León.
The consequence applies, according to the specialist's analysis, regardless of whether the cause is unrelated to the plant's availability . Therefore, the evaluation of an import-backed bid must consider both the physical source of supply and the continuity of the rights necessary to maintain operations throughout the contract term.
This regulatory adjustment comes after a PEG-5 that awarded 1258 MW through 57 projects , of which around 73% corresponded to renewable technologies , with a prominent presence of hybrid solar projects with storage.
The process also achieved an average single-unit price of USD 101/MWh , lower than the current contract prices according to the information provided. PEG-5 thus reinforced the importance of energy storage within Guatemala's new generation capacity and shifted investment criteria towards solutions capable of combining energy, power, and flexibility.
Open Tender 1-2026 is part of this new scenario to cover approximately 300 MW remaining from the previous auction , in addition to needs related to demand growth. The possibility of using firm imports expands the alternatives for meeting these requirements, although now under more precise rules regarding the responsibilities of each participant.
Specifically, the amendment requires differentiating who bears the regular operating costs within the MER and who must resolve any potential supply deficit in the Guatemalan market . This distinction will be relevant in determining how each risk is reflected in the economic terms of the contracts.
An additional purchase on the Opportunity Market may introduce a different economic exposure than that originally anticipated in the awarded bid . Therefore, the scope of the obligations will depend not only on the tender terms but also on how the parties incorporate the new regulations into their contractual clauses.
Grotewold de León emphasized that “the Awardee assuming the costs of managing its transaction in the MER does not mean that it also assumes the risk that this import may be insufficient, a risk that CNEE-282-2026 expressly places on the side of the Distributor.”
The issue thus moves to the negotiation stage: generators, marketers and distributors must contractually specify how the economic impact of a shortage will be allocated , especially when the regulation obliges the Consumer Participant to buy the difference in the Opportunity Market.
“ It is advisable that both parties keep this in mind when negotiating the contractual allocation of this specific risk within the contract derived from Tender 1-2026 ,” concluded Grotewold de León.
While Guatemala moves forward with a new contract for around 300 MW , the modifications to the Commercial Coordination Rules add a critical variable for firm imports from the MER: the winning bidder maintains the obligations related to the administration of the regional transaction, but the treatment of a possible shortfall responds to another mechanism and must be clearly reflected in the contracts of Tender 1-2026 .