The "Let's Get the Bill in Order" bill opened the door to reviewing regulated supply contracts that currently affect the cost of electricity for end customers.
In the market, the question already has a concrete landing: which contracts could be included in that voluntary review , which tenders they emerged from, and which companies concentrate the most relevant agreements.
The initiative does not mention specific companies or individual contracts. What it proposes is to enable, on a one-time basis, a voluntary mechanism to modify existing supply contracts between generators and regulated customers, with the aim of reducing the energy component paid by end users.
That point is what begins to shape the discussion within the sector. Market sources consulted by Energía Estratégica focus their analysis on contracts awarded in previous processes, especially between 2014 and 2016. But with a key caveat: not all contracts from that period have the same weight or the same price profile.
The publicly available records of the National Energy Commission show significant differences between these processes. The SIC 2013/03-2nd call , awarded on December 14, 2014, closed with an average price of USD 108.2/MWh for 11,955 GWh awarded. In contrast, the 2015/02 tender, awarded in October 2015, obtained an average price of USD 79.3/MWh , while the 2015/01 tender, awarded in August 2016, reached an average of USD 47.6/MWh .
Therefore, the sectoral analysis does not simply focus on "all contracts between 2014 and 2016", but on a more specific universe: older agreements , with relatively high prices , relevant volume and years of validity ahead.
In that map, the process awarded in 2014 appears as the most sensitive. It includes contracts such as that of E-CL SA —now ENGIE Energía Chile —for 5,040 GWh/year at USD 109.5/MWh , with supply starting in 2018; Central El Campesino SA , for 4,000 GWh at USD 111/MWh , with supply starting in 2019; and Consorcio Abengoa , for 950 GWh at USD 114.8/MWh , associated with the CSP/solar development that was later linked to Cerro Dominador .
The El Campesino case is one of the most illustrative for understanding the weight of these contracts. According to information presented by the National Energy Commission (CNE) to the Mining and Energy Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, the contract stipulated 2,000 GWh in 2019 and 4,000 GWh annually between 2020 and 2033 , with an offered price of USD 110,985/MWh . Furthermore, the supply reached approximately 6 million regulated customers .
These types of contracts help illustrate why the discussion is not abstract. A voluntary review that impacts large-volume , high-priced agreements could affect the bottom line. But at the same time, any modification requires safeguarding the contractual stability that underpins the regulated market.
In the case of ENEL , the situation requires a different interpretation. The company appears as a relevant player in terms of volume within the regulated supply, but not necessarily under the same "costly contract" logic as the 2014 process. In the 2015/01 tender, awarded in 2016, the then Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA —formerly Endesa Chile, later Enel Generación Chile—was awarded 5918 GWh/year at an average price of USD 50.7/MWh , well below the values observed in the SIC 2013/03-2nd call process.
This difference shapes the map of companies. ENGIE, Central El Campesino/EDF-AME, and Cerro Dominador appear in the sector analysis due to older contracts, high prices, or significant volume. ENEL , on the other hand, is included primarily because of its weight within the regulated supply, not necessarily because it is part of the group of the most expensive contracts.
The mechanism under discussion would not be a unilateral price reduction . The formula the market is considering involves allowing a power generator to accept a reduction in the contract price in exchange for extending its duration.
In other words: accept a lower price in the short term, but preserve economic value through a longer contract term.
“This should be voluntary because these are supply contracts signed between private parties in the latest bidding processes,” said a source in the sector consulted by Energía Estratégica .
Under that logic, the point would not be to disregard contracts, but to build a negotiation with sufficient incentives for both parties.
“I see value in a company wanting to extend the validity of the contract so that it can leverage new infrastructure, for example, at a slightly lower price,” he stated.
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From that perspective, the measure could be attractive to both customers and companies. For regulated customers , because a price reduction on more expensive contracts can be passed on to the final bill. For generators , since extending the term can maintain the present value of the agreement and provide greater predictability to their long-term revenue.
The risk to the next tender
The second discussion opened by the project is linked to the upcoming supply tender for regulated customers . The market is not only looking at which contracts might be renegotiated, but also at what signal that review will send to future bidders.
Chile is preparing a new supply tender with preliminary terms that include 2,835 GWh annually and 15-year contracts. In this context, the way in which the review of existing contracts is handled will be closely watched by generators, developers, banks, and funds that are considering taking on renewed exposure to long-term regulated commitments.
Market analysts suggest that the review process can coexist with the next bidding process if it remains voluntary and offers incentives for both parties. However, the effect could be different if the process is perceived as government pressure on contracts already signed.
“If the measure proves to be voluntary and doesn’t involve the State publicly harassing you in the media, demanding you sit down at the table to negotiate, I don’t see it negatively affecting the next bidding process,” the source indicated.
The central issue lies in the contractual signal . If generators interpret that a future award could be revised under political or media pressure, the perceived risk of the regulated business could increase.
“Otherwise, those awarded the property will think that their price will not be firm or guaranteed over time,” he warned.
The upcoming auction comes after years marked by withdrawals , increased financial demands, congestion , spills , and doubts about the appetite of banks and developers to resume taking on long-term regulated contracts.
In this context, the preliminary guidelines already incorporate changes to improve project monitoring and reduce the risk of non-compliance. According to the source consulted, one of the advances is the early support provided for initiatives.
“What was happening was that you realized the project wasn't going to happen, and therefore the company was going to vote on the contracts very late,” the expert said.
And he gave an example: “You were a year away from starting, you hadn't laid a single stone on the ground, but you had no way of telling him that you weren't going to make it.”
Therefore, he emphasized that "the terms now include monitoring from the financial closing date ."
However, the market still sees room for adjustments. One of the outstanding issues, according to the same source, is raising the guarantee requirements to discourage speculative bids.
The concern is to prevent the entry of actors without the real capacity to finance infrastructure and fulfill their supply commitments. “We don’t want speculators coming in who try to win a contract, then sell it, and make a kind of quick financial turnover without any interest in financing the infrastructure to serve the contracts,” he warned.
Along those lines, he believes that greater guarantees could act as a filter.
Thus, the "Let's Get the Accounts in Order" project and the upcoming supply tender are linked by the same question: how to correct old contracts that are currently putting pressure on the tariff without weakening the confidence that Chile needs to award new long-term regulated contracts.